

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)

- AGAINST -)

ARAKI, SADA0, et al.)

A F F I D A V I T

I, MORISFIMA, Morito, make oath and say as follows:

I am 50 years old, having been born in the City of Kanazawa on February 16, 1896.

I speak, read and understand the English language.

In September 1928, I was sent to Mukden to serve in the capacity of consul as First Assistant to Consul General FAYASFI, Kyujiro. I served in this office until December 1932, during which period I served as Acting Consul General on the occasions when the Consul General was out of the jurisdiction; especially did I serve as Acting Consul General from December 1931 to December 1932, the Consul General having been recalled to Japan at that time on other business.

As the First Assistant to the Consul General, my duties were largely of an executive nature. The office of the Consul General was concerned with matters relating to Chinese affairs, particularly Japan's interests in Manchuria, and all political matters relating to foreign countries, and arranging for the protection of Japanese nationals in peace time. It was the particular duty and obligation of our office to keep posted on current trends and developments which might adversely affect the political policies of the Japanese Government; to anticipate such trends and developments and to currently report conclusions in these respects to the Japanese Foreign Office. In order effectively to perform these duties and functions, the Consul General's office availed itself of all accessible channels of information. Such channels of information consisted among others of the Consular Police, several hundred in number, who were stationed throughout the jurisdiction of our Mukden office; the officials of the South Manchurian Railway; and the Kwantung Government; the officers in the headquarters of the Special Mission of the Army located in Mukden; the Chinese representative in the three Eastern Provinces comprising Manchuria; Japanese nationals located in Manchuria; and many other such sources of information. It was the duty of the Consular Police to make daily reports to our office of any unusual happenings, events or information as to trends and developments. This they did regularly. I, personally, conducted conferences daily with such

of the aforementioned officials and officers as circumstances and conditions suggested the advisability of.

In the performance and discharge of the duties and functions of our office, we were required to and did avail ourselves of the aforementioned channels of information. The office of the Consul General took appropriate official action predicated upon the information so acquired and received and made many reports to the Japanese Government in connection therewith. It was the duty and responsibility of our office to draw conclusions from information so obtained and to advise the Japanese Government as to such trends and developments which might involve Japan's political policies, as such information indicated. This, we endeavored to do as effectively as possible.

In 1928 and 1929, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army was located normally at Port Arthur and the Commander of that Army was Lt. General MURAOKA. Major-General HATA, Shinji, was Chief of the Special Mission of the Army, with headquarters at Mukden and Major MORIOKA was assistant to the Chief of that Mission. These two officers were succeeded by Major-General SUZUKI, Yoshimitsu and Major FANAYA, Tadashi. Later, Major-General SUZUKI was succeeded by Major-General DOIFABA, Kenji. These were the officers whom I normally contacted in the headquarters of the Army Special Mission in Mukden when the desirability of conferences with the military was suggested. Occasionally, it became desirable for me to visit the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in Port Arthur to confer about special matters. Also, I often conferred with the Governor-General of the Kwantung Province and other officials in that office.

When Premier TANAKA came into office, he announced a more positive policy toward Manchuria than had been followed in the predecessor Cabinet. This policy placed the greatest importance on the maintenance of peace and order throughout the whole of Manchuria. It was the first time that Japan had definitely asserted that she would take upon herself the responsibility and task of preserving peace and order in Manchuria. The positive policy also resulted in troops being sent into China proper; that is, Tsinan, on two occasions; namely, May 1927 and April 1928, to insure the safety and protect the rights of Japanese nationals there. The sending of troops into China proper in April 1928 had the effect of deterring the advance of the Chiang-kai-Shek armies toward Peiping and Tientsin.

At this time, Marshal Chang Tso-lin was marshal of Manchuria. In the administration of this positive policy, Premier TANAKA was lending support to and collaborating with Chang Tso-lin. It was the policy of the TANAKA Government to endeavor to promote and expand Japan's interests in Manchuria

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through collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin. This policy of collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin met with strong disapproval on the part of a group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army which at that time was led by Colonel KAWAMOTO Taisaku. There were other younger officers of the Kwantung Army associated in this group and clique whose names I do not now recall. This element in the Kwantung Army felt that the Government should discontinue collaboration and negotiation with constituted authorities in Manchuria and should employ force to preserve and promote Japan's interest there.

At this time, Chang Tso-lin had ambitions to establish his leadership in China proper and as Grand Marshal of his armies had moved his headquarters to Peiping. This met with the staunch disapproval of Premier TANAKA who consistently advised Chang Tso-lin that he should abandon his ambitions in China proper, return to Manchuria and concern himself solely with maintaining his leadership there.

Chang Tso-lin ignored such advice and requests on the part of Premier TANAKA until he suffered defeat in the summer of 1928 when the Southern Army of Chiang Kai-Shek was making a strong advance into North China. At this time, Chang Tso-lin was compelled by military circumstances to return to Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin departed from North China for Mukden in the first week of June 1928. As the train on which he was traveling approached Mukden, he was killed by an explosion which wrecked his train. This explosion was planned and brought about by the element of the Kwantung Army which was dissatisfied with TANAKA's policy of collaboration with Chang-Tso-lin. This murder of Chang Tso-lin created quite a crisis in the TANAKA Cabinet and ultimately resulted in its fall in 1929.

From the date of the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet until the late summer of 1931, the influence of this element of the Kwantung Army in governmental policies grew progressively stronger. During this period, Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Lt. Colonel ISHIFARA, Kanji, and Major FANAYA are among those in the Kwantung Army who became definitely identified with the leadership in this group. This group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army in this period were of the strong opinion that the use of armed forces was necessary to preserve and protect Japan's interests in Manchuria. They seemed to want to occupy it and to establish a government there separate from China proper and which would be subservient to Japan. During this period, many incidents occurred which might be attributed to anti-Japanese feeling prevailing in Manchuria and the policy of restoration of national rights under the leadership of Chang Hsueh-Liang. The Consulate made the greatest efforts to settle these incidents by negotiation and peaceful means so that they might not be used as pretexts for the use of force. However, the determination

on the part of the group and clique in the Army to employ force in Manchuria grew progressively stronger throughout the summer of 1931 and it became more and more difficult for the office of the Consul General and the Government to keep the situation in hand. By late summer it became apparent to all concerned that it was only a question of days until the military would be on the move in Manchuria. In the latter part of August and until the middle of September, the Consular office was seriously concerned with the adjustment and settlement of the NAKAMURA affair. This involved the killing of NAKAMURA, a Japanese officer who allegedly was on an investigation tour in inner-Mongolia for the Kwantung Army. He had obtained a passport from the Chinese under the false representation that he was an agricultural scientist who wanted to conduct research in this field. While engaged in his real mission, his true identity became known and he was killed by a number of soldiers belonging to the regular Army of Chang Fsuch-Liang. On the afternoon of September 18, 1931, negotiations with respect to adjustment and settlement of this affair were in progress between the Consulate and the Chinese representatives. A further conference in the Consulate was adjourned at about eight o'clock in the evening because it had been concluded that since a member of the military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Army before any further representations should be made to the Chinese officials.

Upon the conclusion of this conference at 8:00 P.M., I was delegated the responsibility to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference which was to be held later in the evening. At this time, I endeavored to contact the responsible officers of the Special Mission of the Army in Mukden in order to arrange for them to attend this conference. The officers I endeavored particularly to contact were Colonel DOIHARA, Chief of the Special Mission, and Major FANAYA, the Assistant Chief, who were in charge of the Headquarters office. I was unable to locate either of these officers or any other responsible military officer. After I had sought to locate these officers at their respective offices, billets, and the usual hotels, restaurants and other places which they frequented, I so reported to the Consulate and retired to my personal quarters adjacent to the Consulate.

Earlier in the afternoon of September 18, I had received a report from the Consular Police to the effect that a citizen who was traveling on the train from Antung to Mukden had recognized General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugi who was dressed in civilian clothing and who was traveling from Tokyo to Mukden. This citizen had sought to have General TATEKAWA acknowledge his identity but was evaded. It seemed strange to me at the time that the Consulate should not have been advised of General TATEKAWA's special mission to Mukden.

My inability to locate any of the responsible military officers at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 18, coupled with the report with respect to General TATEKAWA traveling in civilian clothes to Mukden created quite a bit of apprehension in my mind and I so reported to the Consul.

Earlier in the summer, I had learned that the Army had moved a large gun from Hsi-chang, the headquarters of the Artillery Regiment to the Infantry Barracks in Mukden. I inquired of the Army about the significance of this movement but only received evasive answers. Also, I had received many reports that the Army was planning unusual military maneuvers; particularly had I previously learned that the Kwantung Army in Fu-shun the important coal mining district, had planned a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fu-shun at 11:30 P.M. the night of September 18.

All of such reports had served to create an atmosphere of tenseness in the Consulate. It was apparent to me that some unusual military activity was in the making.

By this time, Lt. Colonel ENJIYAMA had become an assistant on Colonel ITAGAKI's staff and from time to time had occasion to speak with him. I learned that he was supporting Colonel ITAGAKI's philosophy that force should be employed to occupy Manchuria.

I was in my personal quarters about 10:30 P.M., September 18 1931, when I received a telephone call from the Army Special Mission advising me that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that I should come over immediately to the Military Special Mission Headquarters. I arrived there about 10:45 P.M. and met Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Major HANAYA, and some other officers whose names I do not recall. Colonel ITAGAKI said to me that members of the regular Chinese Army had exploded the South Manchuria Railway; that this constituted a serious violation of important Japanese rights; that Japan must take appropriate defense measures through the use of military force; and that general orders had already been issued to this effect to the Army. I tried to reason with him that we should resort to peaceful negotiations in an effort to adjust the matter and that I believed that it could be satisfactorily settled in this manner. Colonel ITAGAKI then chastised me and wanted to know if the office of the Consul General intended to interfere with the right of military command. I insisted that there was no question involved of interference with the right of military command but rather that I was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations and that the latter course would be advisable from the viewpoint of the interests of the Japanese Government. At this point in the conversation, Major HANAYA unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if I insisted upon interference with the right of military

command, I should be prepared to suffer the consequences. He stated further that he would kill anyone who endeavored to so interfere. This outburst on the part of Major FANAYA broke up the conversation and I returned to my headquarters to make a full report, which I did. By the time I reached my headquarters, Consul General FAYLSPH had returned from a visit with an acquaintance and I reported to him the developments of the evening in detail.

Upon receipt of my report, the Consul General talked by phone a number of times during the night of September 18 and the early morning of the 19th with Colonel ITAGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting and to permit the Consulate to endeavor to settle the matter through peaceful negotiations. Colonel ITAGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul General that he should cease interference with the right of the military command; that general orders had been issued to the Army and that the Army would proceed as planned. Throughout the night of September 18 we received numerous representations on the part of the Supreme Advisor for Chang Psueh-Liang, then Marshal of Manchuria, that the Chinese were proceeding on a policy of non-resistance and implored the office of the Consul General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks and to resort to peaceful negotiations. All such representations were communicated to the military to no avail and the occupation of Mukden continued. On the day of September 19, in my continued efforts to persuade the Army to cease military activities, I visited the headquarters of the Kwantung Army several times and conferred with officers in the Kwantung Army, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army having been moved by this time from Port Arthur to Mukden. On one of these visits, I observed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, General TATEKAWA who was dressed in civilian clothes. At this time, General TATEKAWA held the office of Chief of one of the departments of the General Staff in Tokyo and I could not understand why he should be in Mukden dressed in civilian attire.

Under the general orders which were issued on the night of September 18, all of the Japanese armies in Manchuria came into operation. The Korean Army which was stationed on the border crossed the Yalu River and came over to participate in the activities. Despite all efforts to control the situation, the Army continued with its occupation of Manchuria which was consolidated by the spring of 1932. In March of 1932, a puppet government was established with Pu-yi as its head. There was no popular movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and the Self-Government Guiding Board, which was created by the Kwantung Army. All of the important and controlling positions in the puppet government were filled by Japanese selected by the Kwantung Army.

Upon the establishment of the puppet government, the Province of Jehol in Inner-Mongolia was declared to be within its sphere of influence. This move proved ineffectual because it did not have the support of the Government nor the people of Jehol. When the Kwantung Army realized this situation, and the continued existence of the exiled Government of Chang Psaeh-Liang in Jehol, the Army proceeded to occupy Jehol and make it a part of the puppet regime by force. This puppet government continued to be dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army until 1945. Japan officially recognized the independence of this Government in September 1932. This gesture in nowise altered the control and domination of the Government by the Kwantung Army.

/s/ MORISFIM., Morito
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SWORN and SUBSCRIBED to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named MORISFIM., Morito, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 26th day of June 1946.

/s/ CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, JAGD
IPS, GHQ, SCAP